What Doth It Profit? Pelikan\u27s Parallels by Smith, Steven D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2006
What Doth It Profit? Pelikan's Parallels
Steven D. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Steven D., "What Doth It Profit? Pelikan's Parallels" (2006). Minnesota Law Review. 14.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/14
SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:28:27 PM 
 
727 
Review Essay 
What Doth It Profit? Pelikans Parallels 
Interpreting the Bible and the Constitution. By Jaroslav 
Pelikan, Yale University Press, 2004. 
Reviewed by Steven D. Smith 
We have all reador perhaps, alas, writtenthe kind of 
book that serves up provocative or even extravagant claims but 
offers little or no supporting evidence. But is the opposite also 
possible? Might someone write a book that carefully and me-
thodically marshals impressive evidence in support of . . . al-
most nothing? And if so, how should we evaluate such a book? 
As useless, or worseas a waste of the authors valuable time, 
and ours? Or as admirableas the near perfect achievement of 
an academic ideal of agenda-free scholarship? Or maybe on 
some sort of evidence-to-claim-ratio criterion in which some-
thing close to zero in the second term will assure a very high 
ratio indeed? 
These are odd questions, probably, but they are provoked 
by Jaroslav Pelikans book comparing biblical and constitu-
tional interpretation.1 Such comparisons have been profitably 
undertaken before by constitutional scholars,2 but it is safe to 
say that no one with Pelikans formidable erudition in Chris-
tian doctrine and hermeneutics has ever attempted the task. It 
is safe to say this because in all likelihood there is no one else 
 
  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I 
thank Larry Alexander, Michael Perry, and Maimon Schwarzschild for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.
  1. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2004). 
 2. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 953 (1988); 
Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Mi-
chael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Maimon 
Schwarzschild, Pluralist Interpretation: From Religion to the First Amend-
ment, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447 (1996). 
SMITH_3FMT 01/23/2006 04:28:27 PM 
728 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:727 
 
with Pelikans erudition in these fields. Over a period of dec-
ades he has established himself as a proven and superb scholar, 
and his unrivaled expertise fosters high hopes for this book. So, 
what of interest or value emerges from his scholarly compari-
sons? 
Its hard to say. To be sure, Pelikan cautions us at the out-
set against false expectations. He concludes the first chapter by 
noting that the book is not intended as a direct intervention in 
the fray of the current exegetical debates, whether biblical or 
constitutional.3 But he also expresses the hope that the book 
may be of some help and illumination also to those who stand 
in the tradition of the two centuries of interpreting American 
Scripture [i.e., the Constitution].4 By the end of this learned 
but puzzling and deeply frustrating book, though, it remains 
far from clear just what help and illumination Pelikan has 
provided. This review reflects on that question. 
I.  PELIKANS RICHLY IMPOVERISHED PRESENTATION 
Pelikans book is composed of four chapters. The first chap-
ter explains that both the Bible and the Constitution have 
served as a Great Code or Scripture for a communitythe 
Christian community,5 the American Republicthat has 
treated the text as normative and authoritative. The chapter 
goes on to note a number of further parallels between biblical 
and constitutional interpretation. Chapter two presents still 
more parallels by discussing an array of common problems that 
interpreters in each tradition have faced: ambiguities, appar-
ently conflicting textual provisions, clashing absolutes, the 
challenge of reconciling interpretations of an ancient text with 
evolving views in the community, and the founding texts si-
lence about who should have final interpretive authority. Chap-
ter three takes note of the conspicuous effort in each tradition 
to discover and return to the texts original meaning, and of the 
obstacles that have confronted such efforts. The final chapter, 
noting the fact of evolving interpretations in both the biblical 
and constitutional traditions, discusses some of the criteria to  
 
 
 3. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 37. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Pelikan notes the possible relevance of comparisons to scriptural in-
terpretation in the other major religions of the book, specifically Judaism 
and Islam, but largely limits his presentation to the area of his own expertise 
in Christian interpretation. Id. at 1518.  
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which interpreters and critics have appealed in order to distin-
guish between benign and malignant growth6 in doctrine. 
In sum: Both the Bible and the Constitution have been re-
garded as authoritative texts; they have thus been subjected 
over the decades and centuries to interpretation. Interpretation 
(including efforts to ascertain original meaning) has encoun-
tered difficulties and has produced disagreements. Conse-
quently, people in the biblical and constitutional traditions 
have had to try to figure out how to distinguish between valid 
and invalid interpretations. 
Described in this way, Pelikans book may seem to be a de-
ployment of massive learning for the purpose of informing us of 
what we all knew before we picked up the book in the first 
place. And in a sense that is what it does. So it is as if you went 
to hear the worlds most celebrated astronomer and were 
blessed with a lecture devoted to explaining that the stars are a 
long, long way away, that they are most readily visible to the 
naked eye in the nighttime, and that they are typically grouped 
together in patterns known as constellations. 
To be sure, this description fails to convey the richness of 
the supporting material with which Pelikan develops and illus-
trates the books radically unprovocative claims. The observa-
tions about Christian hermeneutics are supported with cita-
tions to and illustrations from a multitude of sources and 
examples: the Bible itself, the Church fathers, and a host of 
creeds and confessions and pronouncements from the Orthodox, 
Catholic, and Protestant traditions and from the remotest 
reaches of Christian history up to the present. In case anyone 
doubted Pelikans mastery of the Christian corpus, even this 
small book should dispel any such doubts. The learning on the 
constitutional side of the comparison is less awe-inspiring, not 
surprisingly, but still respectable. 
For some readers, this display of erudition may be enough 
to make the book rewarding: who cares whether any interesting 
or important insights emerge from the exercise? This same 
quality may strike other readers as tiresome or pedantic. And 
these more disgruntled readers might complain that the book 
promisesor at least hints ata larger payoff. I have already 
noted Pelikans tentative proffer of help and illumination.7 In 
addition, Pelikan suggests at the outset that he will be con-
 
 6. Id. at 135. 
 7. See supra notes 34 and accompanying text. 
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cerned with the proper methods for interpreting biblical and 
constitutional texts.8 The remark might lead us to anticipate 
more reflection or analysis regarding what sort of interpretive 
methods are or are not proper or legitimate. 
But by the end of the first chapter, the proper has al-
ready dropped out, and the books purpose has been framed in 
purely descriptive terms. In one sense, therefore, the question 
of this book is very narrow: What are the means and methods 
by which official interpreters read their normative texts?9 The 
remainder of the book hews to that more modest agenda. It is 
for the most part descriptive, nonevaluative, and nonjudgmen-
tal. Pelikan hints at some of his own hermeneutical judgments, 
but he does not really declare them, much less explain and de-
fend them.10 
Even the final chapter on development of doctrine offers 
little to those who might actually be interested in the question 
of whether particular developments in doctrine are permissible 
interpretations of, as opposed to impositions on, the text. Here 
Pelikan reviews the seven criteria proposed by John Henry 
Newman for assessing such developments, but these criteria 
are more in the nature of highly conclusory statements of what 
to think about (or to argue about)11 than of rules or guidelines 
that could help resolve such arguments. For example, New-
mans second criterion (continuity of principles) will already be 
entirely familiar to constitutional interpreterswho will also 
 
 8. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. at 36. 
 10. Pelikan does show that the quest for original meaning encounters ob-
stacles. But he does not explicitly conclude that these obstacles invalidate or 
discredit the idea that original meaning should be the touchstone for interpre-
tation, and he does not infer from the difficulties that the object of interpreta-
tion should be something more like contemporary meaning (whatever that is). 
Nor should he. Such reasoning, though common enough, would be a non sequi-
tur: if there are good reasons for treating original meaning as authoritative (a 
contested point, obviously), the difficulty of ascertaining that meaning should 
not be a sufficient reason for adopting an essentially different approach to in-
terpretation. Imagine the police detective who announces, I started out with 
the intention to discover and arrest the person who actually committed the 
crime, but since the evidence has turned out to be inadequate and inconclu-
sive, I have had to alter my objective: my goal now is to arrest the person that 
the public today would most like to see in jail.
  11. Newmans criteria for assessing interpretations include preservation 
of its type; continuity of its principles; its power of assimilation; its logical se-
quence; anticipation of its future; conservative action upon its past; [and] its 
chronic vigor. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 124 (discussing Newmans tests and 
the revision of those tests in his later work). 
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understand what asserting this criterion can and, more impor-
tantly, cannot do. That is, they will understand that for any 
live constitutional disputeaffirmative action, same-sex mar-
riage, federalismit is of little help to declare that we should 
adopt an interpretation that is continuous with principles dis-
cernible in the text and in past decisions. We already knew 
thattook it for granted, probablyand the dispute will be 
about which among the clashing interpretations best succeeds 
in maintaining such continuity. 
At times Pelikan comes close to acknowledging that the 
development criteria are of little use on the level of actual ap-
plication. Thus, he observes that although Newman initially 
held out his seven criteria as tests, he later and more mod-
estly redescribed them as notes or tokens.12 And Pelikan 
points out instances in Christian historydebates over the use 
of icons and images that divided Eastern Christians in the 
eighth and ninth centuries and later split Catholics and Protes-
tants13 and the Filioque debate14 that was central to the rup-
ture between Western and Eastern Orthodox Christianityin 
which the same criteria later articulated by Newman were 
claimed and cited by contending parties on both sides of the is-
sues (just as they are routinely enlisted by opposing sides in 
American constitutional debates). 
In sum, it seems that Pelikan has provided us with a 
wealth of data, expertly retrieved and organized, but precious 
little illumination. So the margins in my copy of his work are 
filled with And so . . . ? and Where is this going? The learn-
ing is impressive. But whats the point? 
Perhaps this reaction is unfair. After all, what sort of illu-
mination might we reasonably expect to issue from this sort of 
comparison? Are there interesting questions on which we might 
reasonably expect Pelikans undertaking to shed some light? 
 
 12. Id. (citing to JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 206 (2d ed. 1989) (1878)).  
 13. Id. at 139. For more detailed accounts of these controversies, see CAR-
LOS M.N. EIRE, WAR AGAINST THE IDOLS: THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP 
FROM ERASMUS TO CALVIN (1986); 2 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRA-
DITION: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 91145 (1974). 
 14. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 143. The disagreement was over a question 
that, although perhaps alien to most modern sensibilities, was fiercely dis-
puted in centuries past: should the Holy Spirit be said to proceed from the Fa-
ther alone or from the Father and the Son? For a more detailed account, see 
PELIKAN, supra note 13, at 18398.
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II.  VITAL QUESTIONS 
Well, . . . yes. Of course, no book would be able to address 
all of the questions it touches on; we are satisfied if a book ad-
vances our understanding of some of the issues it raises. None-
theless, there are questions that Pelikans discussion might 
naturally lead us to askand to expect from him some notice 
and comment. 
For example, there are what we might call explanatory 
questions. The recognition of similaritiesin persons, prac-
tices, culturesoften provokes such questions. Suppose we ob-
serve, say, similar religious practices in ancient Greece and an-
cient Crete, or in ancient Egypt and pre-Columbian America. 
Or we notice similar ideas and phrases in, say, a European poet 
and an American playwright. Such observations will immedi-
ately provoke a desire for an explanation. Are the similarities 
mere coincidence? Or is there a causal connectionsome sort of 
historical influence, for example?15 If so, which way did it run? 
Who influenced whom? And how did this influence occur? Per-
haps the similarities are neither coincidental nor the result of 
actual historical influence; maybe they reflect the common logi-
cal outcome of some feature or function common to both of the 
things being compared, or the natural and hence parallel re-
sponse to some common question or challenge. Or maybe hu-
mans are just hard-wired to behave in this way? 
Perceived similarities typically and naturally prompt us to 
wonder about such questions.16 In short, in a world in which 
much is random, unexpected similarities call out for some sort 
of explanation. 
 
 
 15. Legal historians, for example, routinely debate such questions. Cf. 
S.F.C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (2003) (noting 
that the influence of Roman law upon English law . . . has been a perennial 
topic among English legal historians).
  16. Both Christian and constitutional scholarship is filled with such dis-
cussions. Scholars of Christianity debate, for example, what influences af-
fected the writing of the various early Gospels and what influence they had on 
each other. Was the Gospel of Mark written first, and did the authors of the 
other Gospels draw on it as a source? And so forth. See, e.g., GRAHAM N. 
STANTON, THE GOSPELS AND JESUS 34138 (1989) (offering an in-depth ex-
amination of the Four Gospels). Scholars of the early American Republic de-
bate the influence of various thinkers and sourcessuch as Locke, Montes-
quieu, the Bible, early writers in the classical republican tradition, and Greek 
and Roman authorson the Founders and the Constitution. See, e.g., VITAL 
REMNANTS: AMERICAS FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN TRADITION (Gary L. 
Gregg II ed., 1999). These debates by now virtually could fill libraries. 
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A different kind of question frequently provoked by the ob-
servation of similaritiesand a question that may be under-
scored by proffered explanations of such similaritiesconcerns 
what we might call efficacy, or perhaps justification. Suppose 
we observe that legal systems in the High Middle Ages em-
ployed some of the same techniques of legal reasoning that had 
been used centuries earlier in Roman law. And suppose further 
that we plausibly explain these similarities by identifying his-
torical influences: legal scholars in Bologna rediscovered some 
older Roman texts, for example.17 The observation and explana-
tion may well prompt us to ask whether these techniques, na-
tive to the Roman world, were equally compatible with medie-
val needs and assumptions. Was this a fruitful importation or 
an incongruous and perhaps unsettling one?18 
These are questions that one might expect Pelikans study 
to lead him to address. How do we explain the similarities be-
tween Christian and constitutional interpretation? Have con-
stitutional interpreters consciously or unconsciously copied the 
hermeneutical techniques that Christian exegetes had been de-
veloping in previous centuries? Or have interpreters in the dif-
ferent traditions independently arrived at the same kinds of 
questions and techniques? If so, how do we explain such paral-
lels? And are interpretive techniques that grow out of Christian 
assumptions about scripture and the world equally efficacious 
or justified in the ostensibly more secular enterprise of consti-
tutional interpretation? 
The mass of hermeneutical similarities that Pelikan sur-
veys virtually thrust such questions upon us. And yet, some-
how, Pelikan deftly avoids noticing them. Nor does he dwell on 
the subtler questions that we might think of as existential.19 
What sort of creatures are we, such that we evidently are 
 
 17. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FOR-
MATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
  18. Christians have long debated such questions in considering, for exam-
ple, the relations between the earliest Christian teachings, growing out of the 
Jewish world, and the Greek thought into which Christian ideas were soon 
translated and from which Christian doctrines and formulations were bor-
rowed. Did Greek philosophy corrupt Christianity or, conversely, allow for the 
happy, faithful development of truths that had merely been implicit in the ear-
liest Christian thought? See, e.g., 1 JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRA-
DITION: A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 1155 (1971); WIL-
LIAM C. PLACHER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 55
67 (1983).
  19. Perhaps the seminal modern reflection on such questions is HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (2d rev. ed. 1999).
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driven by some sort of need to be always interpreting? After 
all, it is conceivable that we could live our lives in a more for-
ward-looking and pragmatic way, making decisions mostly on 
the basis of calculations about what choices will produce favor-
able consequences. There are those who point out the obvious 
good sense in this pragmatic approach.20 And yet it seems that 
whether as religious believers or as citizens of a constitutional 
republic, on many of the most crucial matters we do something 
entirely different and arguably quite bizarre: we purport to 
make our most momentous decisions based on what some an-
cient text is thought obscurely to command. Why do we do this? 
How does this practicethis obsessive deference to a some-
times virtually inscrutable pastmake sense?  
And then there are what we might call presuppositional 
questions. How, or on what presuppositions, is interpretation 
even possible? We say of some nebulous passage in an old text, 
such as Jesus more esoteric parables or the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The people who wrote these words never con-
sciously imagined that they meant X, and the unacculturated 
reader today probably would be surprised to learn that they 
mean X; nonetheless, through careful and conscientious inter-
pretation, we now affirm that the passage means X. Were not 
just imposing our ideas on the text: like it or not, thats what it 
really means.21 We say these sorts of things all the time in re-
ligion and in law: Christians say such things with respect to 
Trinitarian, Christological, and eschatological doctrines; and 
constitutionalists say them with respect to the right to abortion 
and the doctrine against sex discrimination. But how is this ex-
ercise possible and on what presuppositions? What could it 
even mean to say that the text actually means X even if the au-
thors did not intend this and the average reader would never 
guess it? 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LE-
GAL THEORY (1999); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). 
 21. Describing classical practices of interpreting Hebrew scripture, James 
Kugel observes that interpreters treated the text as fundamentally cryptic or 
esoteric. JAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS 18 (1997). Thus, all inter-
preters are fond of maintaining that although Scripture may appear to be say-
ing X, what it really means is Y, or that while Y is not openly said by Scrip-
ture, it is somehow implied or hinted at in X. Id. But Kugel notices the oddity 
of this practice: it is hardly a natural thing . . . . Whether we are reading a 
history book or a newspaper editorial or a rousing hymn, we generally assume 
that what the words seem to say is what they mean to say. Id.
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It might well be that Christian interpreters could give dif-
ferent answers to these questions than constitutional inter-
preters couldand more plausible answers, at least on their 
own premises. If you believe that in some sense the real author 
of a sacred text was not the human scribe who penned the 
words but rather God, then it is not so odd to suppose that the 
text might contain deeper meanings not apparent to the casu-
ally uninspired reader or even to the historical and human au-
thor.22 This has indeed been the assumption underlying much 
Christian biblical interpretation. Pelikan notes this point in 
passing but declines to explore its implications.23 Conversely, 
without the assumption of more than human authorship, the 
search for hidden, unanticipated meanings seems much more 
curious.24 
It is natural to raise such questionsnatural and poten-
tially profitable. Reflecting on them may help us achieve a 
deeper understanding of the similarities we initially noticed. 
And reflection may lift those similarities above the level of raw 
data and help to deepen our understanding not only of the spe-
cific subject we set out to study, but sometimes even of the hu-
man situation, or the cosmos, or whatever it is that drives 
scholars and students to want to spend their lives studying 
things like history or hermeneutics in the first place. 
In sum, the pervasiveness of interpretation provides mate-
rial for extensive reflection25the more so, one might think, 
when we see the same interpretive patterns emerging in ap-
parently independent enterprises with different goals and pre-
suppositions. Indeed, Pelikan starts off his comparisons with a 
nicely crafted statement that not only serves to introduce the 
similarities between Christian and constitutional interpreta-
tion, but that also seems well calculated to provoke the very 
 
 22. Indeed, you might believe, as Aquinas explained, that God is the au-
thor not only of the words contained in scripture but of the events themselves 
narrated in those words; that assumption would provide a further basis for 
finding deeper meanings in the text. See WERNER G. JEANROND, THEOLOGICAL 
HERMENEUTICS: DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE 2829 (1991).
  23. E.g., PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 105. 
 24. I have discussed this incongruity at length elsewhere. See Steven D. 
Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 VA. L. REV. 583 (1993); 
Steven D. Smith, Law as a Religious Enterprise: Legal Interpretation and 
Scriptural Interpretation, in 4 LAW AND RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 
2001, at 83 (Richard ODair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001). 
 25. For an outstanding example that focuses on law, see JOSEPH VINING, 
FROM NEWTONS SLEEP (1995). 
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kinds of existential and presuppositional questions that I have 
just noticedthe questions of What are we? and What for? 
and How is this possible? 
There is a familiar and venerable text, centuries old by now, which is 
the product of multiple authorship (although even after generations of 
historical research and literary analysis we are not always in a posi-
tion to determine with absolute precision just who wrote, or rewrote, 
which parts of it). The text was originally composed under very spe-
cific circumstances, which modern historical scholarship has done 
much to illumine. But far transcending the history of its original 
composition is its official standing ever since, for it has been adopted 
by a community as its normative Great Code, and therefore as occu-
pying a position that in some profound sense stands beyond its own 
history: in Ralph Waldo Emersons fighting words of 1838, not spake 
but speaketh! That normative status is based on the assumption that 
it can be applied to any and all of the radically changed situations of 
later times, many of which the writers who originally framed it could 
not themselves conceivably have foreseen. Every official action of the 
community thus has had the obligation of conforming to it, or any 
rate of not violating it, and of demonstrating that conformity when 
challenged to do so; and members of the community are under the 
strictest possible obligation to obey it. Therefore its words and 
phrases have for centuries called forth meticulous and sophisticated
and sometimes painfully convolutedinterpretation, as well as con-
tinual reinterpretation. By now, this interpretation has grown into a 
massive corpus of authoritative, if often controversial, commentary. 
Yet the text does not itself prescribe the method of such interpreta-
tion; nor does it specifically identify the authoritative agency that 
bears the ultimate responsibility for determining the binding inter-
pretation, much less for revising it.26 
Pelikan observes, plausibly enough, that both the Bible 
and the Constitution fit this description of a familiar and ven-
erable text,27 and he proceeds with his presentation of the 
similarities between biblical and constitutional interpretation. 
He does not remark on the evident strangeness of what he has 
just described. Yet, the passage sketches a practice that, except 
to those so immersed in it that the deeper questions disappear 
from view, cries out for some sort of explanatory or justifying 
account. In this respect, it seems like descriptions of, say, older 
forms of trial by fire or water (convicting or acquitting someone 
of a crime by seeing whether they float when thrown into the 
pond) or augury (deciding whether to go to war by purporting to 
read the entrails of birds).28 What sort of people were these? 
 
 26. PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 45. 
 27. Id. at 67. 
 28. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
47 (3d ed. 1990) (explaining the procedure and methods of proof associated 
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we inevitably ask. What could they have been thinking? On 
what assumptions could these practices have made sense? 
Pelikan has surely reflected on such questions, but he 
seems coy about sharing his reflections with us. There is irony 
here. What does this mean? (or perhaps What does this mean 
for us?) is the hermeneutical question, but while Pelikan dili-
gently describes the ways in which other people have pursued 
that question in their own fields, he seems unwilling to pose 
the question for his own materials and project. One who did not 
know better might almost suppose that he is afflicted with a 
severe lack of curiosity, like a diligent but dull student who can 
dutifully line up the columns in response to a compare and 
contrast question on an exam without ever wondering why the 
comparison might be worth making. 
And yet, this analogy cannot be apt. A lack of curiosity 
does not lead someone to devote decades of his life to acquiring 
a vast knowledge of a subject that carries no obvious or imme-
diate practical payoff. Far from being a dull student, Pelikan is 
a scholarly paragon, and in other work on Christian doctrine 
that does not cross disciplinary lines, Pelikan does pay more at-
tention to some of the presuppositional questions noted here.29 
So it seems there must be some other explanation for his 
reticence in this book. What might it be? I have already noted, 
more than once, that Pelikan is an exemplary scholar. Might 
his very scholarly excellence help account for what comes 
across as a disappointing lack of curiosity? The question calls 
for some observations about the academic environment in 
which Pelikan has lived his scholarly life. 
III.  THE CONTAINMENT STRATEGY 
We understand in particular social settings, if we have 
been properly raised, that there are certain questions that irre-
sistibly flit through our minds but that we must refrain from 
voicing. (How much weight have you gained since I saw you 
last year? How long did you say youd been married, Aunt 
Prudence, when you had your first baby?) The same is true of 
scholarly settings; the ethos or etiquette of various disciplines 
may frown on particular inquiries that the uninitiated might 
 
with trial by ordeal, as well as its intellectual presuppositions).
  29. See, e.g., JAROSLAV PELIKAN, CREDO: HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL 
GUIDE TO CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 
14257 (2003).
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regard as obvious and important. Indeed, in an era of unparal-
leled academic freedom, modern scholarship often exhibits a 
remarkable timidity with respect to fundamental and obvious 
questions. 
Suppose, for example, that you are a professional historian 
writing about some controversial religious figure, like Moham-
med or Joseph Smith, or about a controversial religion, such as 
Islam or Mormonism. The layperson might naturally think that 
the most urgent questions to address, and if possible to answer, 
would be questions of truth. Did these figures, accepted by 
some as prophets, in fact experience the revelations they 
claimed to have received? And are the religions they founded 
actually true? At one remove, the layperson might be interested 
in questions of coherence or integrity. Are the belief systems 
associated with these religions harmonious and internally con-
sistent? Or about value: do these religions promote a good way 
of life? Arent these the obvious questions and the questions 
that prompt human beings to care about such subjects in the 
first place? 
As a respectable scholar with a university job, though, you 
may feel constrained to steer around these kinds of vital ques-
tions, if indeed it even occurred to you to ask them at all. Such 
constraints may arise from a variety of rationales or concerns. 
Some are basically, or at least initially, epistemic. History is 
not a hard science, perhaps, but it has absorbed some of the 
scientific aspiration to stick to what is knowable or verifiable 
with the use of largely empirical methods. These epistemic con-
straints may harden into more fundamental philosophical 
commitmentsinto the naturalistic assumption, for example, 
that what cannot be observed empirically is not real. So the 
misguided historian who innocently tries to decide whether the 
prophet really saw angels has not merely passed beyond what 
is knowable; he has lapsed into silliness, into metaphysical 
nonsense. 
Even scholars who do not hold this reductionist worldview, 
however, may refrain from pressing hard questions for reasons 
that are diplomatic or political or perhaps ethical. After all, in 
writing about Mohammed or Joseph Smith, or Islam or Mor-
monism, you could hardly take a stand on questions of religious 
truth or value without alienating a large section of your audi-
ence. And if questions of truth or integrity or value are raised 
and treated as real questions, then there is the possibility that 
the answer might turn out to be in the negative. Some people
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and not just the adherents of the belief systems in questions 
might find that sort of conclusion to be insufficiently respectful. 
And yet controversial claims of truth or value may be abso-
lutely central to the subject that the scholar has set out to 
study. So how to avoid passing judgment on such claims? A fa-
miliar response, common in history and the social sciences, em-
ploys what we can call the self-contained subject strategy or, 
for short, the containment strategy. A scholar may thus stake 
out what the subject of study is and then limit his or her inves-
tigations to questions that seem internal to the subject. The 
scholar conscientiously declines to pursue other questions that 
are regarded as more external to the subject, and questions of 
ultimate truth or value can be shunted into this external cate-
gory. 
Using this strategy, you, as a professional historian, might 
simply describe what some person or movement of persons said 
or believed. Or perhaps you explore some of the connections 
among and the implications of such beliefs, while delicately 
omitting to speak to the question of whether the beliefs are true 
or justified in any more ultimate sense. Those are questions of 
theology, you might say, or perhaps, of philosophy; at any rate, 
they are outside your jurisdiction. Joseph Smith said an angel 
appeared to him and showed him some gold plates, and his fol-
lowers believed this. These things you might say with confi-
dence, and so there is no need for you, as a historian, to pass 
judgment on whether these beliefs were true. Using this defer-
ential approach, you might limit your study to questions sub-
ject to empirical inquiry, and you might respectfully address 
both believers and nonbelievers without insulting or offending 
them.30 
The self-contained subject approach is hardly confined to 
history or anthropology. In more theoretical disciplines such as 
 
 30. My tentative view is that although this approach is both common and 
appealing, and indeed may seem to be the only alternative open to the secular 
historian, it ultimately does not work. Even the secular historian uninterested 
in deeper questions of religious truth will still need to try to understand the 
character of the figures she studies. Was the self-proclaimed prophet honest, 
cleverly fraudulent, or delusional? But these questions of character cannot be 
neatly separated from the truth of the claims made. In addition, the historian 
will eventually try not merely to report what happened but to offer explana-
tions of what happened. However, religious explanations (It happened be-
cause God so ordained or He did it because God told him to) and secular ex-
planations (economic, political, and so forth) are likely to diverge, and the 
plausibility of these explanations cannot be divorced from the question of the 
truth of the religious claims.
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ethics, religion, and legal theory, variations on the same strat-
egy are subtly or conspicuously adopted for some of the same 
reasons, and perhaps for a deeper reason as wellone that we 
might describe as fear of nihilism. 
Thus, in these disciplines, there is the same science-
inspired desire to stay within the realm of what humans can 
confidently know. Hence the aversion of many philosophers to 
old-style metaphysical speculation, in favor of the close scruti-
nizing of language and the detailed analysis of carefully delim-
ited concepts. There may be the same censoriously naturalistic 
worldview lurking in the background and shaping what the 
academy regards as acceptable and unacceptable scholarship. 
Scholars may also be driven by the same desire to treat their 
subject matterand their scholarly interlocutors and audi-
encewith respect, and thus not to challenge or undermine 
anyones most cherished or constitutive beliefs. 
But beyond these concerns, scholars may be afflicted by the 
premonition that if they press too hard, if they ask the larger 
questions about ultimate truth or justification or value, they 
are likely to discover that the practices we are interested in
and also, more importantly, personally engaged in and commit-
ted toare grounded in . . . nothing. One way to avoid this risk 
is to banish the deeper questions. We might do this by treating 
some discursive practice, such as religion, ethics, or law, as 
self-contained and elementalas itself the proper and suffi-
cient object of study and reflectionwithout bluntly asking 
whether its assumptions are correct representations of any-
thing outside the practice or discourse. 
Thus, Norman Malcolm proposes just this strategy for pro-
tecting religion against skeptical assaults. Religion is a lan-
guage-game and a form of life; it is language embedded in ac-
tion.31 Hence, it does not depend on the existence of any 
independent being who is God.32 The same strategy is apparent 
in a good deal of modern metaethical writing. A recurring con-
cern, sometimes described as Nietzschean, worries that by de-
nying the existence of transcendence or of any built-in purpose 
in the cosmos, modern naturalistic worldviews have cut the 
 
 31. Norman Malcolm, The Groundlessness of Belief, in FAITH 193, 203 
(Terence Penelhum ed., 1989).
  32. Id. (calling the notion of belief in the existence of God which is 
thought to be distinct from belief in God . . . an artificial construction of phi-
losophy). 
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ground out from under our ethical beliefs and commitments.33 
In some thinkers, this diagnosis can lead to a kind of dark des-
peration.34 One tempting response to this concern is simply to 
conflate morality with moral discourse and practice. It can 
hardly be denied, after all, that we talk about ethical questions 
and announce ethical judgments. Whatever doubts some may 
have about ethics, ethical discourse is certainly real. So phi-
losophers can occupy themselves in studying the intricate 
workings of this discourse, considering questions internal to the 
discourse and treating more external questions as inadmissible, 
thereby deflecting fears of ethical nihilism. To the old-fashioned 
(or perhaps the hard-headed) this strategy may seem like a 
kind of evasion,35 but its appeal is readily understandable. 
In law, besieged in modern times by varieties of skepti-
cism, legal realism, and critical subversion, this strategic re-
sponse may be inviting. Thus, the self-contained subject ap-
proach is boldly embraced and advocated in the theorizing of 
Dennis Patterson36 and Philip Bobbitt,37 for whom legal dis-
course is its own world with its own internal truth, so to speak, 
and is not representative of anything outside itself. [L]egal 
propositions are not propositions about the world, Patterson 
declares.38 [L]aw is a practice of argument.39 There is only 
the practice and nothing more.40 
 
 33. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(2d ed. 1984) (offering a powerful and much-discussed argument to this effect); 
see also RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001).
  34. For two expressions of this attitude, one from a philosopher and the 
other from a law professor, see W.T. STACE, MAN AGAINST DARKNESS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 10 (1967) and Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural 
Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229 (1979).
  35. See JOHN M. RIST, REAL ETHICS: RECONSIDERING THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF MORALITY (2002). Rist contends that in fact there are only two coherent 
metaethical positionsa metaphysical moral realism that most modern theo-
rists eschew, and nihilism. Id. at 3844. [A]ll other possibilities [are] good-
natured muddles to be collapsed by the clear-headed into Thrasymacheanism. 
Id. at 44. Positions that purport to be neither objectivist nor nihilist are main-
tained only through deception and self-deception (including outright lying). 
Id. at 37; see also ERNEST GELLNER, POSTMODERNISM, REASON AND RELIGION 
4950 (1992).
  36. See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996). 
 37. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982). 
 38. PATTERSON, supra note 36, at 135 (explaining Bobbitts view). 
 39. Id. at 181. 
 40. Id. at 142. I discuss and criticize this view in STEVEN D. SMITH, LAWS 
QUANDARY 7074 (2004).
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A more central and influential instance in law, although a 
complicated one that I cannot elaborate on here, is found in 
H.L.A. Harts self-enclosing explanation of legal authority. It 
asserts, basically, that the rule of recognition on which a sys-
tem of law depends is authoritative if and because legal offi-
cials regard it as authoritative.41 A similar containment strat-
egy is discernible, arguably, in the efforts of Harts long-time 
academic antagonist, Ronald Dworkin, to defeat skeptical chal-
lenges to law and morality. In essence, Dworkin divides skepti-
cal claims into internal and external varieties; he then tries 
to deflect or deconstruct the external claims, so that the im-
portant or viable challenges are necessarily internal in na-
ture.42 But it is the nature of internal claims that they assume 
or accept the very legal or moral discourse that they seemed to 
challenge, so that discourse becomes insulated against the most 
serious and sweeping challenges by being elevated into a self-
contained system. 
In sum, for an array of reasons epistemic, political, and 
ethical, and sometimes as a defense against fears of nihilism or 
emptiness, modern scholars often adopt the strategy of treating 
some movement, discourse, or practice as self-grounding, self-
validating, or sufficient unto itself. This strategy operates to 
dismiss, as pointless or inapt, questions about deeper meaning, 
truth, or justification. Many of the inquiries that we might 
naturally be tempted to make are thus ruled out of order. What 
is the point of wondering about the truth of a discourse that 
constitutes its own truth? And why ask whether there is any 
justification for a practice that is self-justifying? In this vein, 
Patterson approvingly summarizes Philip Bobbitts view of con-
stitutional law: The key is to see that the practice of judicial 
reviewor, more broadly, constitutional lawrequires no justi-
fication . . . . Law is not a theory: it is a practice . . . .43 Conse-
 
 41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10017 (2d ed. 1994). Perhaps 
not coincidentally, Pelikan quietly assumes a somewhat similar premise in ac-
counting for the authority of Christian and American Scripture. He suggests 
that the Bible and the Constitution are authoritative because Christian and 
constitutional communities accept them as such. See PELIKAN, supra note 1, at 
8, 22. Of course, the members of those religious and constitutional communi-
ties might object that this characterization gets things exactly backwards: the 
texts are not authoritative because they are accepted, but rather are accepted 
because they are authoritative.
  42. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 7685 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, 
Objectivity and Truth: Youd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). 
I thank Larry Alexander for pointing out this feature of Dworkins theorizing.
  43. PATTERSON, supra note 36, at 136 (referring to Philip Bobbitts views 
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quently, there simply is nothing more for philosophy to do 
than describe accurately the practice of constitutional argu-
ment, for that practice is constitutional law.44 
This last assertion provides the perfect segue back to Pe-
likans own treatment of constitutional interpretation. In this 
view, my disappointment with Pelikans book for being merely 
learnedly descriptive while failing to reflect on the interesting 
attendant questions would be unfair and profoundly misguided. 
That is, if there is nothing more for philosophy to do than de-
scribe accurately the practice of constitutional argument, then 
it may be that Pelikan has done the only thing that sensibly 
can be done. This is what constitutional interpreters do, the 
sage explains. Maybe so, the naive critic concedes, but why? 
It all seems so strange. How does this practice make sense? 
Those questions are misconceived, the sage gravely replies. I 
have told you what constitutional interpreters do. That is all 
that need be saidall that can be said. 
Indeed, it seems that Pelikans approach is wholly consis-
tent with the containment strategy evident in so much modern 
scholarship; his book is virtually a paradigm case. Exactly what 
motivates his resort to that strategy is something that I can-
notand perhaps even he could notknow with any certainty. 
But it seems plausible to suppose that Pelikan may have 
adopted that strategy for the same kinds of reasons we have 
noticed already. There is security in merely describing what 
constitutional and biblical interpreters have done. To go further 
and theorize about why they have done these things, or about 
whether their practices are justified, would be epistemically 
risky and there would be a real risk of giving offense. It might 
turn out, for example, that hermeneutical techniques that 
make sense on Christian assumptionsabout God being the 
real author of scripture or about the Holy Spirit operating in a 
developing Christian traditionmake no sense at all on the 
secular assumptions that govern the constitutional enter-
prise.45 
That conclusion might not merely offend; it might be sub-
versive, suggesting, for example, that a good deal of what the 
modern Supreme Court says as it goes about striking down 
 
as expressed in his work, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 37).
  44. Id. at 136 n.39.
  45. For a discussion of the development and use of hermeneutical tech-
niques in theology, see generally JEANROND, supra note 22. 
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laws, traditional institutions, and practices is a sort of irra-
tional idolatry disguising an elitist exercise of power. But by 
now we take the Courts behavior for granted; in some sense, 
we may even depend upon it. Our world would be upset if that 
practice were shown to be irrational or, as we say, illegiti-
mate. So it is understandable that an eminent and respected 
scholara Yale man, no lesswould be loathe to go down a 
road that just might culminate in such distressing conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
Jaroslav Pelikan has given us a characteristically erudite 
book. But readers may be pardoned for regretting that while 
surveying the hermeneutical methods that Christians and con-
stitutionalists have adopted, Pelikan has refrained from posing 
the hermeneutical questionwhat does this mean?with re-
spect to the numerous parallels he presents. 
I have suggested in this Review that what might appear to 
be a remarkable failure of curiosity is better explained as the 
application of a containment strategy familiar in much modern 
scholarship. Although the appeal of that strategy is under-
standable, the approach is also a costly one. It aims to provide a 
modest but epistemically secure understanding of a given prac-
tice. But since the practitioners themselvesthe religious be-
lievers, the people who engage in moral discourse, and the 
Christian and constitutional interpretersdo not typically un-
derstand their practice as self-contained and self-sufficient, the 
strategy risks providing a systematically skewed account of its 
subject matter. The self-contained subject strategy is especially 
problematic with respect to the compare and contrast sort of 
study that Pelikan is engaged in here, because if the practices 
are actually self-contained, it becomes unclear how they can in-
telligibly or profitably be compared. 
Perhaps most importantly, as this Review has discussed at 
length, the containment strategy may prevent an eminent 
scholar from addressing (and from sharing his wisdom concern-
ing) some of the most important questions that likely motivated 
both the scholar and the readers to take an interest in the sub-
ject in the first place. So the reaction may be one that attends 
some of the most impressive modern scholarship: A remark-
able achievement. Oh, and by the way, . . . why should anyone 
care? 
 
